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ABSTRACT 
 Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, public schools may only 
restrict student speech where the speech is reasonably forecasted 
to cause a “substantial and material disruption.” With online 
forums calling into question who may control speech and forecast 
its impact, the circuit courts have granted public schools broad 
authority to monitor, and punish, their students for online activity 
that occurs off-campus. The Supreme Court recently declined the 
opportunity to reverse this disturbing trend by denying certiorari 
for Bell v. Itawamba County. As a result, questions remain 
unanswered regarding students’ right to free speech and how 
courts should address First Amendment cases in the digital realm. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Today’s high school students often express themselves digitally, 
utilizing texts, Facebook, Tweets, and Tumblr to share their innermost 
thoughts and impressions.1 One of the hallmarks of online speech is its 
ability to be quickly copied and disseminated, allowing an original thought 
to be perpetually shared and duplicated outside the control of the original 
speaker. 
 Circuit courts have struggled to apply First Amendment law to 
online speech. As a result, there has been a lack of uniformity in their 
application of the First Amendment to issues like occupational speech2 and 
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1 Amanda Lenhart, It Ain’t Heavy, It’s My Smartphone: American Teens & the 
Infiltration of Mobility into Their Computing Lives, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 
14, 2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/06/14/it-aint-heavy-its-
my-smartphone-american-teens-and-the-infiltration-of-mobility-into-their-
computing-lives/. 
2 Speech uttered in a professional context, not as a personal expression. See, e.g., 
Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197, 201–02 (5th Cir. 2011) (cert. denied Nov. 30 
2015) (holding that a content-neutral regulations of the veterinary practice that 
require a veterinarian “physically examine an animal . . . before treating it” does 
not violate the First Amendment”).   
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online threats.3 The Supreme Court has never addressed how online speech 
should be analyzed under the First Amendment, and has, at times, 
deliberately sidestepped the issue when presented directly.4  
 One of the most important questions is how public schools can 
regulate and punish the online speech of their students. The seminal case 
relating to this topic is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District5, a 1969 case permitting schools to only punish speech 
which causes or leads the school to forecast a “material and substantial 
interference” at the school.6 The years since Tinker have seen a number of 
other cases which chip away at Tinker’s protections, as well as 
technological innovations that change the way students communicate. The 
ambiguity regarding Tinker’s application to online speech has allowed 
public schools to use the “material and substantial interference” rule as a 
justification to invade their students’ privacy and punish them for speech 
originating off-campus. 
 The Court had a chance to address this question in Bell v. 
Itawamba County School Board,7 a Fifth Circuit case in which a student 
was punished for a song he recorded and uploaded off-campus, but denied 
certiorari.8 With the Court now persisting on a course of declining to 
address online speech cases, circuit courts continue to advance competing 
views that erode the First Amendment rights of public school students. 
I. THE EVOLVING TINKER STANDARD 
  Before Tinker, it was not clear whether First Amendment 
protections for public school students ended at the school door.9 Tinker— 
which held that a public school could not punish students for wearing 
black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War— was a decisive victory 
for students, creating a “material and substantial interference” test that 
                                                     
3 See Elonis, 135 S.Ct.; U.S. v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Jackson v. Ladner, 626 F. App’x. 80 (5th Cir. 2015). 
4 See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (“Given our 
disposition [reading a mens rea requirement of at least knowledge into the statute 
and holding that the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea under the 
statute], it is not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.”). 
5 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
6 Id. at 511. 
7 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S.Ct. 1166 (2016). 
8 See id. 
9 Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2009). 
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balanced the necessity of an orderly school environment with the rights 
and freedoms afforded to students by the Constitution.10 
 In considering what constitutes a “material and substantial 
interference,” cases that came before the Court seemed to hinge less on an 
actual disruption to the schoolroom and more on the Court’s own sense of 
decorum, or judgment calls on what students should and should not be 
exposed to. 
 In Bethel School. District No. 403 v. Fraser, 11 the Court held that 
a high school could punish a student who gave a “lewd” speech, 
incorporating sexual references and hip thrusting, at a school assembly.12 
It caused great amusement among most classmates, confusion among 
others, and fury and embarrassment on the part of the teachers.13 While 
not beyond what one might encounter in the average high school hallway, 
the Court held that the speech could be punished, citing “bewilderment” 
shown by some students who did not fully understand the sexual innuendo 
as evidence of a substantial and material disruption.14 This was the first 
time that student confusion, without evidence that such confusion caused 
further disruption, satisfied the Tinker standard. 
 The Court continued to broaden the right of schools to punish 
student speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.15 In 
Hazelwood, a school district deleted two pages from articles from an issue 
of the student-led newspaper.16 These articles were about teen pregnancy 
and divorce, featuring interviews with unidentified students who had 
experience with such issues.17 The principal feared these students (or their 
families) would be embarrassed when the articles were published, even 
though the students had consented to the interviews.18 The majority noted 
this was not a case about tolerating speech, as in Tinker, but was rather a 
case about “promoting” speech (the school allowing the newspaper to be 
published would be seen as a promotion of the speech inside).19 In this 
context, the Court seemed to focus on what was “appropriate” for the 
school environment, remarking that, “such frank talk was inappropriate in 
                                                     
10 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; Clay Weisenberger, Constitution or Conformity: When 
the Shirt Hits the Fan in Public Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 51, 52–53 (2000). 
11 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
12 Id. at 685. 
13 Id. at 678. 
14 Id. at 683. 
15 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 U.S. 560, 562 (1988). 
16 Id. at 565. 
17 Id. at 565–66. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 569–70. 
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a school-sponsored publication . . . .”20 Recognizing that this did not meet 
the Tinker standard, the Court held that Tinker need not be applied when 
said speech was being published under the school’s name (here, as part of 
a school-sponsored publication).21 A school may censor such content if 
such censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”22 There was, however, no concern evidenced that the 
newspaper publication would appear to have been written by the school, 
or even officially approved by the school before publication. It was 
presented as wholly the work of the students, and yet, because the school 
facilitated the speech by publishing the newspaper, the Court allowed 
censorship of speech without application of Tinker.  
 The Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick23 is the closest the 
Court has come to determining whether off-campus speech is subject to 
Tinker.24 The student in Morse held up a banner reading “Bong Hits 4 
Jesus” while at a school-sponsored function.25 Though this did not take 
place directly on school grounds, it was just outside the actual school, 
happened during school hours, and took place at a school event, making it 
virtually indistinguishable from in-school speech. The banner was held up 
in front of television cameras.26 It undoubtedly caused embarrassment to 
the school, but it is less apparent that it caused a substantial and material 
disruption to the school environment. The Court, finding that the banner 
was a disruption, limited its holding to restricting student speech at a 
school event when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.27 The Court’s reasoning distilled down to a fear that the banner 
would undo the school’s hard work in warning students about the dangers 
of drugs. The Court thought “peer pressure” was a leading cause of drug 
abuse by students,28 and worried that allowing the banner to go unpunished 
would allow students to pressure their peers into using drugs. Such an 
argument fails to utilize any part of the Tinker analysis. Nowhere in the 
Court’s analysis was a substantial and material disruption identified. 
                                                     
20 Id. at 572. 
21 Id. at 571. 
22 Id. 
23 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
24 In his dissent, Justice Stevens notes the off-campus nature of the speech. “It is 
also relevant that the display did not take place “on school premises,” as the rule 
contemplates. While a separate district rule does make the policy applicable to 
“social events and class trips,” Frederick might well have thought that the 
Olympic Torch Relay was neither a “social event” (for example, prom) nor a 
“class trip.” Id. at 440 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
25 Id. at 397 (majority opinion). 
26 Id. at 399. 
27 Id. at 397. 
28 Id. at 408. 
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Instead, it found a long-term interest in preventing drug abuse—which 
may never have manifested itself while the listeners were students. This 
case punished the speech simply for its offensive nature, or more 
generously, for its potential long-term effects, rather than the actual or 
possible effect on the school environment.29 
 What is most concerning about these decisions is their passing 
consideration of the actual or projected impact of the speech at the school, 
instead focusing on the Court’s subjective perception of the speech. What 
is shocking, offensive, or indecorous to courts may very likely be 
commonplace to high-school students, and what is commonplace is less 
likely to disrupt the school environment. Because judges and justices are 
far closer in age to the administrators, courts have tended to interpret 
speech similarly to teachers and administrators.30 However, since Tinker 
hinges on student reactions, Tinker requires that student perceptions be 
considered. Because students are so acclimated to explicit or sexual 
language, they are much less likely to be “disrupted” with sexually explicit 
or profanity-laced speech.31 The above cases have therefore twisted Tinker 
into a license to punish speech that is not materially disruptive, but merely 
offensive to judicial and administrative sensibilities.  
 In light of this erosion, Tinker’s application must be specifically 
examined in the context of online speech by the ultimate authority of the 
Supreme Court. The alternative is that Tinker will continue to be used as 
a one-size-fits-all justification by school administrators to censor student 
speech. 
II. TINKER AND ONLINE SPEECH 
 Questions about a public school’s right to punish online speech 
became a concern shortly after online forums for speech (e.g. Myspace, 
chat rooms, and digital hangouts) first began appearing online.32 The 
question in such cases is whether a school has any right to punish off-
                                                     
29 Further, the Court was clear that there was no other applicable First Amendment 
doctrine beside Tinker that could be applied in this case. See id. at 393 
(“Frederick’s argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected.”). 
30 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1092 (2008) (“[L]ower courts applying the Tinker standard have 
tended to give substantial deference to a school's determination that the challenged 
expressive activity was in fact substantially and materially disruptive.”). 
31 See, e.g., Anna-Brita Stenström, TRENDS IN TEENAGE TALK: CORPUS 
COMPILATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 78 (1996) (“Even the most obscene words 
do not seem to offend the teenagers.”). 
32 See Marie L. Bittner, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: Students’ First 
Amendment Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 86 CLEARING HOUSE 174 ,176 
(2013). 
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campus speech—in short, whether Tinker should even apply to off-campus 
speech, regardless of its effect. 
 It was not until 2008 that any circuit addressed a case of a student 
punished for speech that originated off-campus.33 Since then, four other 
circuits (totaling five) have considered the issue, advancing several 
different approaches on how to best determine when off-campus speech 
can be punished.34 No circuit court has completely protected online speech 
from the schools. In fact, current approaches advocated by the circuit 
courts allow for all speech by teenagers enrolled in public schools to be 
considered “student speech,” which may seriously infringe on student 
freedom of speech. 
A. The “Foreseeability” Test 
 In Doninger v. Niehoff, the second circuit held that a high-school 
student could be punished for a blog post where she expressed frustration 
with one of her teachers.35 The court recognized that the off-campus nature 
of the speech was problematic: 
“If Avery had distributed her electronic posting as a handbill on 
school grounds, this case would fall squarely within the Supreme 
Court's precedents recognizing that the nature of a student's First 
Amendment rights must be understood in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment… [i]t is not clear, however, 
that [these precedents] appl[y] to off-campus speech.”36  
 Despite this recognition, the court decided that Tinker was 
applicable, as school discipline is permissible where it is “reasonably 
foreseeable that the [speech] would come to the attention of school 
authorities and that it would create a risk of substantial disruption.”37 In 
other words, any speech by students is subject to the jurisdiction of school 
administrators so long as the material or substantial interruption required 
by Tinker is foreseeable, regardless of where or when it originated. 
 This “foreseeability test” is not clearly defined in Doninger or any 
subsequent cases which rely on the second circuit’s holding. It alters the 
foreseeability test defined in Tinker, where Tinker looks at what the school 
could reasonably foresee, not what the student could reasonably foresee. 
The analysis, however, appears to be the same. In Doninger, the factors 
that led the court to determine Tinker was applicable were the same factors 
                                                     
33 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).  
34 The First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, as well as the 
Supreme Court, have been wholly silent. 
35 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45, 53. 
36 Id. at 49. 
37 Id. at 50. 
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that allowed the court to determine Tinker could punish Doninger’s 
speech. Although there appears to be a separate part of the analysis given 
in the opinion— that it must first be foreseeable that the speech would 
come to the attention of the school authorities— courts assume if the 
speech can foreseeably cause a substantial or material disruption, it is 
foreseeable that it will reach the school authorities. Therefore, there is 
really no separate analysis being undertaken. Once the court has 
determined the speech can reach the school authority, it has already 
determined the speech can be forecasted to cause a substantial or material 
disruption. 
 The idea that Tinker must apply wherever it can punish is 
troubling, as it suggests limitless application of Tinker. The Fourth Circuit 
has created a test with a different name but a similar problem, as it too 
allows Tinker to apply wherever it can punish.38  
B. “Sufficient Nexus” Test 
 In 2011, the Fourth Circuit held that a middle-school girl who 
created a MySpace page targeting one of her classmates could be punished 
by her school.39 Rather than adopt wholesale the “foreseeability” test 
presented by the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit created an even more 
nebulous test, holding that Tinker can be extended to speech which has a 
sufficiently strong nexus with the school’s pedagogical interests.40 The 
pedagogical interest here was preventing bullying.41 The court did 
consider foreseeability in determining whether the nexus existed, holding 
“it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski's conduct would reach the 
school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices . . . .”42 
This test for foreseeability, coupled with the victim’s shame and hurt, 
allowed Kowalski’s off-campus speech to be punished as if it had occurred 
on-campus. 
 Kowalski presented a far less sympathetic student than that of 
Doninger— here was a student who targeted and bullied one of her 
classmates, encouraged other classmates to join in, and, undoubtedly, 
caused great pain and embarrassment to her victim.43 The court seemed 
offended that she would even bring a lawsuit alleging a violation her 
rights, adding this admonishment to the opinion:  
                                                     
38 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011). 
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 573. 
41 See id. at 572 (“[S]chool administrators must be able to prevent and punish 
harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school environment conducive 
to learning.”) 
42 Id. at 574. 
43 See id. at 567–68. 
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Rather than respond constructively to the school’s efforts to bring 
order and provide a lesson following the incident, Kowalski has 
rejected those efforts and sued school authorities for damages and 
other relief. Regretfully, she yet fails to see that such harassment and 
bullying is inappropriate and hurtful and that it must be taken 
seriously by school administrators in order to preserve an appropriate 
pedagogical environment.44  
 In such cyber-bullying cases there is undeniable appeal in 
allowing schools to punish such conduct. If not the school, who? What 
other institution has the power to stop such an insidious and harmful form 
of student-on-student misconduct? Yet Kowalski’s holding is another 
example of how allowing Tinker to punish online speech erodes the First 
Amendment rights of our nation’s youth, expanding the reach of public 
schools to regulate the speech of students when they are outside of school 
grounds and off school time.45  
 By reimagining the facts of Kowalski as a genuine off-campus, 
face-to-face interaction between the students, the idea of the school 
punishing the student for her speech seems far less likely. Allowing the 
school such power would be to give the school the right to reach into the 
private lives of their students. The end result would have been nearly the 
same— shame and hurt for the victim, and student gossip the following 
day among the students, which of course would have been foreseeable on 
the part of the bully— but the school would likely not have had the power 
to punish the bully. After all, in this hypothetical circumstance, the bully 
was acting outside her capacity as a student. The dichotomy is unjustified. 
Expanding Tinker into off-campus, online speech would suggest that 
Americans in the public school system are forced to surrender their First 
Amendment rights between the ages of five and eighteen.46 
 Moreover, the Kowalski holding once again allows Tinker to apply 
wherever it can punish. Here, the “pedagogical interest” can include 
keeping order in the classroom, or preventing a substantial disruption. The 
nexus is established based on the foreseeability that the speech would 
reach the classroom and disrupt this pedagogical interest. The analysis, 
then, jumps immediately to the Tinker analysis (and, indeed, the school’s 
                                                     
44 Id. at 577. 
45 See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1399 (2000) (“[T]he Court has indicated that its decisions limiting the rights 
of students in school do not limit their rights outside of school.”). 
46 See Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of 
Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 572, 597 (2009) (“In and out of class, 
permissible conduct is defined by what is proper conduct of students qua students. 
Meaning, students acting in their capacity as students. The Court's decision [in 
Tinker] only regulated the student-school relationship.” (emphasis added)). 
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punishment of Kowalski was found to be acceptable under Tinker),47 as 
though there is no distinction between targeted bullying on school grounds 
and an online event outside of school. 
C. Remaining Circuit Approaches 
 The third,48 eighth,49 and ninth50 circuits have taken similar 
positions, largely adopting Doninger’s foreseeability test. Most cases in 
these circuits have punished students for their off-campus speech, though 
one case in the third circuit applied the Tinker standard and found the 
speech could not be punished because no substantial and material 
disruption was caused or foreseen.51 On one hand, J.S. ex rel Snyder seems 
to have a positive effect for student speech rights, as it moves away from 
the idea that any speech that can be punished under the “substantial and 
material disruption” standard; on the other hand, this case assumes Tinker 
can be applied to all student speech regardless of its actual effect, once 
again reinforcing the idea that schools have unbounded authority to at least 
evaluate the speech their students’ while off campus.52 This raises 
questions of just how far a school can reach. Can they punish speech that 
occurs over summer vacation? What about speech from several years ago 
that remains in digital form? 
 In 2014, the Fifth Circuit appeared to have a similar holding to 
that of J.S. ex rel Snyder, until a rehearing returned to the idea that Tinker 
should be able to punish any speech that could foreseeably cause a 
substantial and material disruption. Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board,53 was the most recent case to confront Tinker’s applicability to 
online speech, even requesting certiorari (an appearance before the 
Supreme Court). 
D. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board 
 In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board a high school student 
and aspiring rapper named Marcus Bell created a rap song naming and 
                                                     
47 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574. 
48 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
49 S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 
2012) 
50 Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
51 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931–33. 
52 In most student speech cases, the punishment comes after the disruption, when 
the school has been able to observe exactly what the effects of the speech are. 
However, because Tinker allows a school to punish where it is foreseeable that 
the speech might cause a disruption, it is possible that schools could search the 
online lives of their students for speech that might conceivably reach the school 
and cause a disruption, raising additional privacy concerns. 
53 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) 
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shaming two teachers at his school for sexually harassing several female 
students.54 His speech caused no demonstrable substantial or material 
disruption, though one of the teachers admitted to adopting a less familiar 
teaching style with female students55 (arguably preventing further school 
disruption). The song was played only once on school grounds, by one of 
the accused teachers, who accessed it by listening to it on a student’s smart 
phone, against school policy.56  
 When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, a three-judge panel, 
without explicitly finding that Tinker could reach the speech, found there 
was no (actual or foreseeable) substantial or material disruption caused by 
the speech.57 The school board appealed and at a rehearing a divided panel 
reversed.58 The majority focused on what they considered to be “threats” 
in Bell’s song59 and held that, though Tinker’s application to off-campus 
speech was not a resolved issue, “Bell's admittedly intentionally directing 
at the school community his rap recording containing threats to, and 
harassment and intimidation of, two teachers permits Tinker's application 
in this instance.”60 
 A dissent by Judge James L. Dennis took issue with both the idea 
that Tinker could reach off-campus speech in general and the idea that 
Bell’s speech caused a substantial and material disruption.61 On the first 
point, Dennis noted that a textual analysis of Tinker, as well as subsequent 
student speech cases by the Court, supported the notion that only speech 
which took place inside the school or at school-sponsored events could be 
punished. Tinker’s language not only referenced speech that took place 
“inside the schoolyard gate” but also the “special characteristics of the 
school environment,” while noting that “school officials do not possess 
absolute authority over their students.”6263 
                                                     
54 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (2014), rev’d on rehearing en 
banc, 799 F.3d 379 (2015). 
55Id. at 290. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 282. 
58 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 382 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 1166 (2016). 
59 Namely, “get a pistol down your mouth” and “gonna hit you with my Ruger,” 
which Bell stated were not direct threats and the teachers admitted they did not 
take seriously. Bell, 774 F.3d at 309–10. 
60 Bell, 799 F.3d at 394. 
61 Id. at 403–33 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 384 (majority opinion).  
63 While it is true that Tinker also states that “conduct by the student, in class or 
out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior— materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
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 Of all the student speech cases that have been heard, Bell was 
perhaps the best contender to reach the Supreme Court and establish the 
first real precedent on how student speech should be addressed. The 
speaker in question was not a student bully or an aggrieved student merely 
complaining about unfair policies; rather, he was being censored for 
bringing educators’ sexual misconduct to the students’ attention. 
However, like each case before it that appealed to the court, Bell’s petition 
for certiorari was eventually denied by the Court. 
III. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS REMAINING 
A. Student: A Day Job, or a State of Being? 
 By allowing off-campus speech to be punished by schools, courts 
implicitly hold that any child who is enrolled in public school is a student 
both on and off campus. The Fifth Circuit’s en banc holding in Bell 
described “students qua students” or students acting in the capacity of 
students.64 The court apparently believed that public-school attendees are 
always acting in the capacity of students whenever they create any speech 
that might be related to school, the students or faculty, or their feeling 
about the institution itself. The dissent noted this worrisome assertion: 
By simply assuming that all children speak “qua students,” the 
majority’s legal analysis begins with the false premise that the speech 
at issue constitutes “student speech” that must be “tempered in the 
light of a school official’s duty” to teach students appropriate 
behavior. But the Supreme Court has never suggested that minors’ 
constitutional rights outside of school are somehow qualified if they 
coincidentally are enrolled in a public school.65  
 When a child enrolled in public school returns home for the day, 
are they still a “student?” If not, their speech can hardly be termed “student 
speech.” It is true that the school day takes up much of a student’s time, 
and is where the majority of their relationships are formed (though the 
online world has even changed this; students can form close relationships 
                                                     
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech,” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis added), which would seem to suggest that 
Tinker’s exception does apply to off-campus speech, the opinion previously refers 
to comments made between students “outside of the classroom,” referring to the 
school hallways. Therefore this sentence is best understood to allow regulation of 
any speech occurring on school grounds, whether during class or elsewhere in the 
school, and not as a license for the school to regulate off-campus conduct. 
64 Bell, 799 F.3d at 389. 
65 Id. at 415 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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with people they may never meet in person).66 However, the school’s 
influence surely must end somewhere. It would be unheard of for a school 
to punish a student for not following a school dress code when that student 
was at home on a Saturday. Digital verbal speech, however, has been 
judged in Bell and the like cases as something over which a public school 
should have a broader control. 
 There comes a point when a school’s ability to regulate comes into 
conflict with a parent’s right to discipline and control their own child. The 
Supreme Court has previously addressed this issue in the context of in loco 
parentis.67 This doctrine has been articulated as early as the 1800s by 
American courts.68 In brief, the doctrine allows schools to assume the 
power of parents during the school day, so they may punish student 
behavior which would disrupt the school environment.69 It suggests that 
there is a clear delineation between a student on school grounds and a 
student at home, particularly in the context of what rights a school has over 
the student. Allowing schools to regulate online/off-campus speech puts 
schools in the position as acting as their students’ “parent” at all times. 
 This broad power thus conflicts with a parent’s right to discipline, 
though circuit court have yet to recognize this as a consequence of broad 
school control over student speech. In Bell, the student’s mother, Dora 
Bell, alleged violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to make 
decisions regarding the care and custody of her child.70 The district court 
dismissed this claim,71 and no other court has recognized this as a viable 
claim in similar student-speech cases. 
                                                     
66 See Wendy Walsh, Janis Wolak, & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Close Relationships 
with People Met Online in a National U.S. Sample of Adolescents, 7 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY 1, 4 (2013). 
67 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 383 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–
55 (1995). 
68 See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (N.C. 1837). 
69 See Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 413. 
70 Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 859 F.Supp.2d 834, 841 (N.D. Miss. 2012), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 774 F.3d 280 (2014). 
71 The court acknowledged that there was a conflict, but held this did not equate 
to a violation of Dora Bell’s constitutional rights. Under the prevailing standard 
set by Gruenke v. Seip, a school punishment that conflicts with the interests of the 
parents may prevail if the punishment is “tied to a compelling interest.” Gruenke 
v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir.2000). Because protecting the school from a 
substantial and material disruption can always be termed a “compelling interest,” 
Fourteenth Amendment claims by parents in student speech cases are unlikely to 
be successful if the Third Circuit test is widely adopted. There does not appear to 
be any Supreme Court cases offering a different test.  
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B. “Threatening” Online Speech 
 One of the chief concerns noted in the Bell opinion was the issue 
of “threatening” speech, with the opinion suggesting that shielding such 
speech from punishment might have dire consequences given the 
prevalence of school violence in recent years.72 This reasoning, however, 
ignores current First Amendment law, which already has recourse to 
punish speech which threatens the safety of students and administrators. 
 Before a Tinker analysis can even begin, the speech in question 
must first clear other First Amendment hurdles. If a student were to hang 
up an obscene drawing in school, for example, his punishment would not 
undergo a Tinker analysis but rather a Miller analysis— the test which 
determines whether a communication falls under the “obscenity” 
exception to the First Amendment.73 Courts have also carved out 
exceptions to the First Amendment where speech is threatening,74 meaning 
that threats of school shootings or constant threats of death or injury would 
likely never even reach a Tinker analysis. Instead, the speech would be 
curtailed by a broader exception that applies to all Americans, not just 
students. 
 If a “true threat” analysis would have been performed in Bell, 
Bell’s speech would have likely been found to be protected, as Watts v. 
United States75 ruled that threats which are obviously hyperbole are 
protected by the First Amendment.76 Bell’s lyrics were not meant to be 
taken seriously as threats, and in fact were not taken seriously by anyone 
within the school; thus, Watts would likely hold it to be protected speech. 
There is no reason to believe that Bell’s speech would need to undergo 
some deeper level of scrutiny simply because its subject was about two 
teachers. The Supreme Court has never made any rulings to the effect that 
a response to threats should be heightened when in a school environment, 
or that Watts would somehow not suffice to distinguish a student’s 
protected hyperbolic speech from a student’s unprotected threatening 
speech.  
                                                     
72 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 432–34 (2015) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
73 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). 
74 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means 
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not 
actually intend to carry out the threat.”) 
75 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
76 Id. at 708. 
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 In fact, a “true-threat” analysis might even serve as a tool against 
cyber-bullying. The Eighth Circuit has previously applied this analysis to 
off-campus student speech in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School 
District,77 in which an eighth grade student wrote two violent and 
threatening letters to his ex-girlfriend.78 In these letters he berated her, 
insulted her, and threatened to rape and kill her.79 The letters were written 
off-campus and were brought to school by a third student after the victim 
had already heard it, making it off-campus speech.80 Rather than consider 
how Tinker should be applied, the Second Circuit focused on the 
threatening nature of the speech, holding that it fell under the “true threat” 
exception to the First Amendment.81 
 Pulaski did not feature online speech, but the same principle could 
apply to threats posted on Facebook or Twitter. It is true that many 
instances of cyber-bullying would not rise to this level of threat. 
Nonetheless, a true threat analysis is certainly a viable option in the most 
severe of cases, and it is the appropriate recourse when considering actual 
threats against the school and its students or administrators, as alleged in 
Bell. Further, schools have other means of recourse to prevent them from 
being helpless in the face of cyber-bullying, such as counseling for the 
bully and victim, which turns the situation into a learning experience rather 
than a First Amendment minefield.82  
 There is no evidence that a school has ever used the Tinker 
exception to stop a planned act of school violence, as such cases would 
likely require police involvement, not an act of school discipline. Giving 
schools the right under Tinker to punish off-campus threats would likely 
lead to punishing speech of the kind identified in the Watts exception and 
identified in Bell— hyperbolic statements made out of frustration by 
children who are using what they think is a safe outlet for their personal 
feelings. In such hyperbolic cases, the “forecasted” school disruption is 
more unreasonable than foreseeable, and punishing students for venting 
their frustrations could do more harm than good. 
                                                     
77 Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002). 
78 Id. at 619. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 632. 
81 Id. at 622. 
82 See Papandrea, supra note 30, at 1098. Counseling would be unlikely to be 
considered a “punishment” or suppression of speech for which a student could 
seek a legal remedy, as there would be unlikely to be an injury on which a student 
could establish standing for suit. 
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C. The Necessity of Student Freedom of Expression  
 It can be easy to think of student speech in terms of the harm it 
can cause: the victims of bullying, the in-school disruptions, the possible 
in-school violence. Such consequences to speech are really only present in 
the school environment, perhaps explaining why Tinker’s exception 
erodes First Amendment protection granted to adults. But children and 
teenagers benefit most from freedom of expression,83 and curtailing their 
rights might have grave consequences.  
 The Supreme Court itself has noted that “the character of a 
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”84 That character is 
formed by exploration, by experience, and by expression. It has been long-
held that freedom of expression leads to discovery of truth,85 and there is 
arguably no group in greater search of truth than juveniles. The Supreme 
Court has even noted that it is through exposure to new information that a 
student passes from the realm of a child, whose constitutional rights are in 
some manners curtailed, to an adult.86 
 Furthermore, curtailing the rights of children on the assumption 
that children require special regulation, due to their fragility or inability to 
think before they speak, does harm to all of society. The social significance 
of affording right of expression to children sends a message to society as 
a whole that expression is to be celebrated and encouraged from a young 
age, and promotes important discourse in every age group.87  
 Allowing schools to access and judge students’ online thoughts 
also raises grave concerns about student privacy. Settings on profiles such 
as on Facebook might allow students to regulate who is able to see their 
                                                     
83 A child’s right to freedom of expression is in fact so important that it has been 
recognized by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, art. 13, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The child 
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media 
of the child's choice.”). 
84 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
85 Stanley Ingber , The Marketplace of Ideas, A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 3 (referencing Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919)). 
86 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (allowing a teenaged student to 
make a decision about an abortion if she could show she was “mature and well 
enough informed.”); see also Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School 
Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (discussing the importance of the 
right to receive information in the public school setting). 
87 John Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights, 6 INT’L 
J. L., POL’Y, & THE FAM., 221, 224 (1992). 
170 SCHOOLS, SPEECH, AND SMARTPHONES [Vol. 15 
posts, but schools, claiming a concern about a potential disruption, could 
easily curtail such restrictions. Indeed, in Bell, the rap song was initially 
posted on Facebook under settings that only allowed Bell’s online friends 
access. Students who post something anonymously could be identified by 
the public if the school could claim a material disruption, to identify the 
speaker. Giving school administrators the right to examine “private” 
thoughts, or at least those meant to be shared with a select group of people, 
is akin to flipping through a student’s diary. Online privacy is a nebulous 
idea and has been left largely untouched by courts.88 The privacy of 
students is an important issue that demands resolution. 
 Today many school campuses restrict the ability to access social 
media sites where much off-campus online speech can be found. 
Therefore, when this speech comes to campus, it usually comes on 
smartphones, as in Bell. Just as schools hold searches of lockers or bags 
for reasonably expected incriminating material, will we be seeing routine 
searches of smartphones for inappropriate texts or online posts under the 
broad Tinker justification? 
CONCLUSION 
 Tinker is considered a landmark case, not for affording schools the 
right to punish speech, but for the broad freedom of expression it gives 
public school students. In the years following Tinker, the Court has 
seemingly regretted giving students such freedom, and has carved 
numerous exceptions to Tinker’s ultimate provision: that there are only 
very rare circumstances where student expression can be punished.  
 Today, teenagers’ speech is particularly vulnerable to school 
punishment due to digital media. Without clear direction from the Court, 
the circuits have adopted conflicting approaches to when schools can 
punish speech originating off-campus. This not only gives schools greater 
control over teenagers’ off-campus lives, but sends a message that student 
speech is less worthy of protection than that of adults.  
 
 
                                                     
88 See Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line 
Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 129 (2005). 
